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  Debates	   about	   ecological	   responsibility	   are	   interested	   in	   different	   forms	   of	  belonging.	  This	  article	  develops	  an	  understanding	  of	  a	   custodial	   form	  of	  belonging	  based	   on	   the	   logic	   of	   relation,	   as	   distinct	   from	   a	   proprietorial	   form	   of	   belonging	  based	   on	   the	   logic	   of	   identity.	   Theorists	  working	   on	   questions	   of	   belonging	   use	   a	  language	  of	   custodianship	  when	  describing	   a	   sense	  of	   responsibility	   and	   care	   that	  arises	  through	  connection	  or	  relation.	  We	  argue,	  however,	  that	  the	  full	  significance	  of	   custodial	   belonging	   cannot	   be	   appreciated	   when	   theorists	   derive	   their	  understanding	  of	  connection	  from	  within	  the	  terms	  of	  identity	  logic.	  In	  other	  words,	  when	  belonging	  is	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  identity	  and	  identification,	  custodianship	  is	  inadvertently	  reduced	  to	  a	  proprietorial	  form	  of	  responsibility	  and	  care.	  We	   begin	   by	   giving	   an	   account	   of	   the	   differences	   between	   identity	   and	  relational	   logics,	  drawing	  out	  the	   implications	  for	  understanding	  different	  forms	  of	  belonging.	  While	  social	  theory	  commonly	  understands	  relation	  or	  connection	  as	  the	  interaction	   of	   definable	   identities	   or	   subjects,	   we	   show	   that	   relationality	   is	   an	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ontological	   state	   of	   non-­‐finitude	   that	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   identity	   and	   which	   is	  instead	   the	   primal	   ontological	   state	   from	  which	   identity	   emerges.	  While	   identity-­‐based	   theory,	   then,	   cannot	   account	   for	   relation,	   we	   show	   that	   relational	   theory	  recognises	   the	   co-­‐existence	   of	   and	   relation	   between	   identity	   and	   relational	   states.	  We	  will	  outline	  a	  relational	  approach	  that,	  by	  distinguishing	  different	  forms	  of	  being,	  space	   and	   time,	   allows	   for	   conceptual	   distinctions	   between	   different	   forms	   of	  sociality	  and,	  hence,	  belonging.	  We	   then	   address	  Australian	   research	  on	   custodial	   belonging.	   Focusing	   on	   the	  influential	  work	  of	  Deborah	  Bird	  Rose,	  we	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  tensions	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  her	  attempts	  to	  recognise	  connected	  forms	  of	  belonging,	  and,	  on	  the	  other,	   her	   conceptual	   reliance	   on	   the	   assumptions	   of	   identity	   logic.	   Our	   primary	  concern	   here	   is	   to	   indicate	   relational	   possibilities	   in	   her	   work	   precluded	   by	   the	  language	   of	   identity.	   In	   particular,	  we	   suggest	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   ecological	   being	  allows	  for	  a	  specificity	  and	  inclusiveness	  that	  are	  not	  recognised	  by	  Rose’s	  concept	  of	  the	  ‘ecologically	  emplaced	  self’.	  
—IDENTITY AND RELATIONAL LOGICS In	   this	   section	   we	   outline	   a	   relational	   approach,	   drawing	   on	   the	   work	   of	   Martin	  Buber.1	   Buber	   provides	   the	  most	   rigorous	   account	   of	   relational	   logic	   as	   he	   shows	  how	  it	  allows	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  both	  identity	  and	  relational	  logics	  and	  the	  relation	  between	   them.	   We	   will	   start	   with	   Buber’s	   distinction	   between	   ‘I-­‐It’	   and	   ‘I-­‐Thou’,	  each	  of	  which	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  distinctive	  ontology,	  space	  and	  time.	  The	  ontology	  of	  I-­‐It	  is	  that	  of	  an	  identity	  or	  subject,	  a	  form	  of	  being	  that	  is	  finite	  and	   bounded,	   a	   thing,	   defined	   by	   a	   border	   between	   self	   and	   other,	   subject	   and	  object.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  subjecthood	  is	  based	  on	  the	  logic	  of	  binary	  oppositions;	  the	  identity	  of	  an	  ‘I’,	  one	  and	  self-­‐same,	  is	  constituted	  through	  and	  (implicitly)	  depends	  upon	  a	  ‘not-­‐I’.	  The	  other,	  it	  follows,	  is	  only	  seen	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  self	  and	  not	   respected	   for	   their	   otherness;	   that	   is,	   identity	   logic	   reduces	   difference	   to	  opposition	   (the	   other	   is	   simply	   ‘not-­‐I’).	   As	   this	   logic	   of	   opposition	   implies,	   the	  ontology	  of	  identity	  presumes	  that	  space	  is	  Euclidean,	  that	  entities	  are	  defined	  by	  a	  non-­‐shared	   location	   or	   position	   on	   a	   grid.	   Positions	   are	   distinguished	   by	   distance	  understood	   as	   a	   spatial	   void,	   a	   separation	   without	   connection,	   an	   opposition	  
Game, Marlin and Metcalfe—Custodial Belonging	  
	  
177 
between	  inside	  and	  outside,	  subject	  and	  world.	  Since	  these	  distances	  are	  measurable	  (a	  metre,	  a	  kilometre),	  Euclidean	  space	  is	  abstract	  and	  homogenous.	  	  The	   temporal	   counterpart	   to	   Euclidean	   space	   is	   linear	   time,	   time	   on	   a	   line	   of	  distinct	   units,	   past,	   present	   and	   future.	   Like	   Euclidean	   space,	   linear	   time	   is	   an	  abstraction	   from	   lived	   experience;	   it	   is	   homogeneous,	   understood	   as	   a	   temporal	  series,	   measurable	   in	  minutes,	   hours,	   days.	   This	   time	   is	   characterised	   by	   both	   an	  endless	   repetition	  of	   the	   same	  and	  a	   forward	  moving	   trajectory;	   the	  present	   is	   no	  more	  than	  an	  impossibly	  small	  measure	  of	  time,	  overwhelmed	  by	  the	  anticipation	  of	  the	  future	  or	  nostalgia	  for	  a	  future	  past.	  	  Within	  the	  world	  of	  I-­‐It,	  relation	  is	  logically	  secondary,	  arising	  from	  the	  coming	  together	  of	  previously	  separate	  things.	  But,	  Buber	  says,	  this	  world	  of	  bounded	  things	  is	  not	  the	  only	  world.	  He	  says:	  	  The	   life	   of	   human	   beings	   is	   not	   passed	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   transitive	   verbs	  alone.	  It	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  virtue	  of	  activities	  alone	  which	  have	  some	  thing	  for	  their	  object.	  	  I	  perceive	  something.	  I	  am	  sensible	  of	  something	  …	  This	  and	  the	  like	  together	  establish	  the	  realm	  of	  It.	  But	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  Thou	  has	  a	  different	  basis.	  When	  Thou	  is	  spoken,	  the	  speaker	  has	  no	  thing	  for	  his	  object	  …	  Thou	  has	  no	  bounds	  …	  The	  relation	  to	  the	  Thou	  is	  direct.	  No	  system	  of	  ideas,	  no	  foreknowledge,	  and	  no	  fancy	  intervene	  between	  I	  and	  Thou	  …	  No	  aim,	  no	  lust,	  and	  no	  anticipation	  intervene	  between	  I	  and	  Thou….2	  The	  relational	  being	  of	  I-­‐Thou	  is	  not	  the	  being	  of	  identity	  or	  subjecthood.	  Not	  a	  one	  or	   thing	   generated	   by	   the	   exclusion	   of	   or	   opposition	   to	   another	   one	   or	   thing,	  relational	  being	  is	  non-­‐finite	  or	  dialogic,	  based,	  this	  is	  to	  say,	  on	  the	  non-­‐arithmetic	  principle	   of	   no-­‐thing-­‐ness.	  When	   used	   as	   a	   synonym	   for	   infinitude,	   nothingness	   is	  not	   lack	   but	   the	   inherent	   openness	   or	   potential	   of	   relational	   being.	   In	   this	  world,	  difference	  is	  not	  experienced	  as	  the	  simple	  opposite	  of	  sameness.	  Neither	  inside,	  nor	  outside,	   the	   world	   of	   relation	   is	   characterised	   by	   a	   difference	   and	   sameness	   that	  cannot	  be	  located	  or	  defined	  against	  any	  other	  thing.	  	  To	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  principle	  of	   different-­‐and-­‐same,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   appreciate	   the	   particular	   quality	   of	  relational	  space	  and	  time.	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While	   locations	   of	   identity	   occur	   in	   the	   abstractions	   of	   Euclidean	   space	   and	  linear	   time,	   relations	   happen	   in	   the	   uniqueness	   of	   here,	   now.	   Indeed,	   the	   non-­‐locatable	  here,	  now	  is	  the	  living	  reality	  from	  which	  the	  Euclidean	  and	  the	  linear	  are	  abstractions:	  ‘With	  all	  deference	  to	  the	  world	  continuum	  of	  space	  and	  time	  I	  know	  as	  a	   living	  truth	  only	  concrete	  world	  reality	  …	  Inseparable,	   incomparable,	   irreducible,	  now,	   happening	   once	   only,	   it	   gazes	   upon	   me	   with	   an	   awesome	   look’.3	   The	   non-­‐Euclidean	  here	  of	  I-­‐Thou	  cannot	  be	  mapped	  because	  there	  is	  no	  delimitation	  of	  what	  is	   here;	   this	   is	   not	   the	   here	   of	   a	   bounded	   identity	   or	   subject,	   but	   the	   here	   of	  connection	  from	  which	  there	  are	  no	  exclusions.	  In	  the	  dialogic	  of	  I-­‐Thou,	  ‘here’	  and	  ‘there’	   are	   not	   separate	   locations;	   here-­‐and-­‐there	   is	   an	   ecological	   space	   in	   which	  insides	   and	   outsides	   are	   intertwined,	   in	   which	   the	   inside	   is	   also	   outside,	   and	   the	  outside	  is	  inside.4	  The	  term	  ecological	  is	  important	  here,	  for,	  in	  this	  space,	  relations	  take	  the	  form	  of	  mutual	  participation;	  that	  is,	  of	  being	  in	  the	  world	  and	  the	  world	  in	  being.	   Ecological	   space	   is	   a	   space	   without	   locations	   and	   it	   is	   only	   this	   space	   that	  allows	  for	  difference-­‐and-­‐sameness.	  	  Just	  as	  the	  non-­‐Euclidean	  here	  is	  here-­‐and-­‐there,	  so	  the	  non-­‐linear	  now	  is	  now-­‐
and-­‐then,	  an	  unfolding	  present	  that	  holds	  within	  it	  all	  time,	  past,	  present	  and	  future.	  For	   Buber,	   the	   present	   only	   comes	   with	   the	   relation	   of	   I-­‐Thou:	   ‘the	   real,	   filled	  present,	  exists	  only	   in	  so	   far	  as	  actual	  presentness,	  meeting	  and	  relation	  exist.	  The	  present	   arises	   only	   in	   virtue	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Thou	   becomes	   present’.5	  Connectedness	  always	  occurs	  in	  this	  present,	  which	  ‘is	  not	  fugitive	  and	  transient,	  but	  continually	   present	   and	   enduring’.6	   ‘[C]reation’,	   Buber	   says,	   ‘does	   not	  merely	   take	  place	   once	   in	   the	   beginning	   but	   also	   at	   every	   moment	   throughout	   the	   whole	   of	  time’.7	  In	  short,	  ‘the	  beginning’	  is	  always	  with	  us,	  the	  unique,	  non-­‐linear	  now.	  To	   illustrate	  Buber’s	  distinction	  between	   I-­‐It	   and	   I-­‐Thou,	  we	  will	   consider	  his	  example	  of	   the	  different	  ways	  of	  encountering	  a	   tree.	  When	  he	   is	   in	  an	  I-­‐It	   form	  of	  being,	  a	  subject	  in	  a	  world	  of	  objects,	  Buber	  says	  he	  can	  see	  a	  tree	  as	  picturesque,	  he	  can	  admire	  its	  vitality,	  he	  can	  classify	  it	  as	  a	  species	  and	  study	  it	  as	  a	  type,	  he	  can	  see	  it	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  scientific	  law	  or	  turn	  it	  into	  a	  number.	  But,	  in	  all	  these	  cases	  ‘the	  tree	  remains	  my	  object,	  occupies	  space	  and	  time’.8	  Reified,	  the	  tree,	  like	  the	  subject,	  is	   locatable	   in	   Euclidean	   space	   and	   linear	   time.	   This	   is	   the	   representational	  categorised	  world	  of	  identities.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  world.	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It	   can,	   however,	   also	   come	   about,	   if	   I	   have	   both	   will	   and	   grace,	   that	   in	  considering	  the	  tree	  I	  become	  bound	  up	  in	  relation	  to	  it	  …	  To	  effect	  this	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  me	  to	  give	  up	  any	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  I	  consider	  the	  tree.	  There	  is	  nothing	  from	  which	  I	  would	  have	  to	  turn	  my	  eyes	  away	  in	  order	  to	  see,	  and	  no	  knowledge	  that	  I	  would	  have	  to	  forget.	  Rather	  is	  everything,	  picture	  and	  movement,	  species	  and	  type,	  law	  and	  number,	  indivisibly	  united	  in	  this	  event.	  	  Everything	  belonging	  to	  the	  tree	  is	  in	  this:	  its	  form	  and	  structure,	  its	  colours	  and	  chemical	  composition,	  its	  intercourse	  with	  the	  elements	  and	  the	  stars	  are	  all	  present	  in	  a	  single	  whole.9	  The	   significance	   of	   being	   ‘in	   relation’	   with	   the	   tree	   hinges	   on	   the	   preposition	   in,	  which	   can	   be	   used	   in	   either	   a	   Euclidean	   or	   a	   wholistic,	   ecological	   sense.	   In	   the	  former	  sense,	  in	  implies	  containment:	  there	  are	  insides	  and	  outsides	  demarcated	  by	  walls.	   Just	   as	   chalk	   is	   in	   a	  box,	   the	   tree	   is	   in	   the	   categories	  and	   spatial	  boundaries	  that	  define	   it.	  But	   in	   the	  wholistic	  or	   ecological	   sense,	   in	   implies	  participation	  and	  implication.	  When	  we	  are	   in	   life,	  or	   in	   the	  world,	  we	  are	   in	  a	  relation	  that	  does	  not	  locate	  insides	  or	  outsides	  or	  identities.	  There	  is	   just	  this,	  whatever	  is	  present,	  here,	  
now.	  The	  tree	  is	  not	  there,	  at	  a	  distance	  from	  my	  here;	  all	  there	  is	  is	  here,	  here-­‐and-­‐there,	  a	  presence	   that	   involves	  both	  me	  and	   the	   tree,	  which	   ‘have	   to	  do	  with	  each	  other’,	   which	   are	   not	   the	   same	   but	   are	   nonetheless	   in	   each	   other.	   The	   inclusive	  nature	   of	   this	   particular	   encounter	   is	   indicated	   by	   Buber’s	   reference	   to	   the	   non-­‐finite,	  wholistic	  quality	  of	  I-­‐Thou:	  ‘its	  intercourse	  with	  the	  elements	  and	  the	  stars	  are	  all	   present	   in	   a	   single	  whole’.	   Thus,	  we	   could	   say,	   for	   example,	   that	   all	   trees	   (and	  birds	   and	   elements	   and	   places)	   are	   present	   in	   this	   tree:	   the	   particular	   holds	   and	  opens	  to	  the	  whole.	  We	   began	   this	   article	   by	   making	   a	   distinction	   between	   a	   form	   of	   belonging	  based	  on	  identity	  and	  one	  based	  on	  relation.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  this	  discussion	  of	  Buber’s	  I-­‐It	   and	   I-­‐Thou,	   we	   can	   now	   clarify	   the	   distinction	   between	   different	   forms	   of	  belonging.	  When	  based	  on	  identity,	  belonging	  arises	  through	  an	  identification	  with,	  for	   example,	   a	   place,	   thus	   presuming	   a	   sense	   of	   sameness	   and	   an	   exclusion	   of	  otherness	   and	   difference.	   This	   identity-­‐based	   understanding	   of	   belonging	   informs	  theories	  of	  community	  and	  belonging	  that	  emphasises	  attachment,	  mutual	  interests	  and	  a	  shared-­‐sense	  of	  'who	  we	  are'.10	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Freya	   Mathews,	   for	   instance,	   argues	   that	   a	   sense	   of	   belonging	   arises	   when	  people	   are	   able	   to	   see	   themselves	   in	  place	   and	   to	   see	   place	   in	   themselves;	   that	   is,	  when	   they	   recognise	   place	   as	   continuous	   with	   the	   self.11	   In	   her	   account,	   the	  identification	  of	   self	  with	  place	   forms	   the	  basis	  of	   community.	   'When	   I	  assume	  the	  name	   Freya	   of	   Brunswick	   or	   identify	   as	   Merri	   Creek	   woman,	   then	   I	   feel	   an	  immediate	  affinity	  with	  others	  whose	  names	  or	  identities	  link	  them	  to	  my	  place'.12	  In	  Mathews'	  account,	  communities	  form	  around	  shared	  interests	  and,	  she	  argues,	  these	  shared	   interests	   neutralise	   initial	   differences	   between	   people,	   creating	   a	   common	  identity	   around	   their	   relationship	   to	   place.	   For	   Mathews,	   then,	   belonging	   is	   the	  achievement	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  sameness	  that	  cannot	  acknowledge	  difference.	  Many	   contemporary	   social	   theorists	   have	   been	   critical	   of	   the	   concepts	   of	  belonging	   and	   community	   for	   this	   reason,	   arguing	   that	   they	   are	   predicated	   on	   a	  desire	   for	   unity,	   and	   are	   unable	   to	   acknowledge	   difference.13	   While	   proprietorial	  forms	   of	   belonging	   are	   exclusive,	   privileging	   sameness	   over	   difference,	   Buber’s	   I-­‐Thou	  relation	  shows	  us	   that	   there	   is	  another	   form	  of	  belonging	  which	   is	   inclusive,	  involving	   a	   meeting	   with	   difference	   in	   which	   sameness	   and	   difference	   are	  intertwined.	  This	  is	  custodial	  belonging.	  It	  is	  a	  form	  of	  belonging	  based	  on	  care	  and	  mutual	  participation.	  	  The	   concept	   of	   custodial	   belonging	   will	   be	   developed	   more	   fully	   in	   the	  following	   section,	   but	   we	   would	   like	   to	   make	   some	   clarifying	   remarks	   at	   this	  juncture.	  In	  recent	  years	  the	  language	  of	  custodianship	  has	  become	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  accounts	  of	  belonging	  in	  Australia.	  Situated	  in	  the	  broader	  question	  of	  how	  settler	  cultures	   can	   belong	   in	  Australia,	   a	   number	   of	   theorists	   have	   turned	   to	   Indigenous	  communities	   to	   develop	   alternatives	   to	   models	   of	   belonging	   based	   on	   ownership	  and	  possession.	  Theorists	  such	  as	  Moreton-­‐Robinson,	  Plumwood,	  Rose	  and	  Mathews	  write	   about	   an	   'ontological'	   relationship	   to	   place	   which	   is	   based	   on	   mutual	  responsibility:	  place	  sustains	  the	  life	  of	  those	  who	  live	  in	  it	  and,	  in	  turn,	  the	  people	  and	   other	   life	   forms	   that	   live	   on	   the	   land	   take	   care	   of	   it.14	   For	   some,	   the	  responsibility	  that	  underlies	  such	  an	  ontological	  relationship	  requires	  an	  acceptance	  of	  difference.15	  However,	  many	  theorists	  still	  presume	  that	  responsible	  action	  is	  the	  action	  of	   a	   subject	   for	   an	  object	   (a	  place,	   community	   or	   another	  person)	   and	   thus	  they	   retain	   the	   analytical	   privilege	   of	   identity	   within	   the	   relationship	   between	  persons	  and	  places.	  This	   logic	   sets	   the	  other	   (whether	   it	   is	  a	  person	  or	  place)	  at	  a	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distance	  which	  then	  needs	  to	  be	  overcome.	  Returning	  to	  the	  example	  above,	   in	  the	  case	  of	  Mathews'	  understanding	  of	  belonging,	  it	  is	  an	  initial	  and	  oppositional	  form	  of	  difference	   that	   is	   overcome	  by	   the	   establishment	   of	   shared	   interests	   and	   common	  goals.	  Again	   Buber	   can	   help	   us	   here.	   He	   argues	   that	   I-­‐Thou	   is	   the	   basis	   of	  responsibility	  because	  to	  be	  responsible	  is	  to	  respond:	  ‘Genuine	  responsibility	  exists	  only	   where	   there	   is	   real	   responding’.16	   Where	   there	   is	   a	   subject	   who	   assumes	  responsibility	  for	  an	  other,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  real	  responding,	  for	  ‘the	  tree	  remains	  my	  object’.17	  A	  response	  to	  otherness	  or	  difference	  only	  arises	  through	  being	  ‘bound	  up	  in	  relation’	  with	  the	  tree,	  so	  that	  the	  tree	  is	  not	  a	  thing	  but	  a	  living	  presence	  that	  is	  at	  once	   different	   and	   connected.	   In	   relation,	   call	   and	   response	   cannot	   be	   located	   in	  Euclidean	  space	  and	  linear	  time,	  and	  so	  responsibility	  cannot	  be	  experienced	  as	  the	  possession	  of	  any	  one	  or	   thing:	   the	  difference	   that	  calls-­‐and-­‐responds	   is	  here-­‐and-­‐there,	  occurring	  in	  the	  real	  lived	  present.18	  	  	  	  
—DEBORAH BIRD ROSE AND ‘THE EMPLACED ECOLOGICAL SELF’ We	  will	  now	  consider	  the	  work	  of	  Deborah	  Bird	  Rose,	  a	  leading	  scholar	  in	  the	  field	  of	  the	   ecological	   humanities	   in	   Australia.	   Drawing	   on	   her	   anthropological	   fieldwork	  among	   the	   Yarralin	   people,	   Rose	   has	   developed	   an	   understanding	   of	   belonging	  based	   on	   ecological	   interdependence,	   through	   which	   the	   well-­‐being	   of	   persons	   is	  tied	  to	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  places.	  An	  ‘emplaced	  ecological	  self’	  cares	  and	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  place	  that	  cares	  for	  them.19	  In	   ‘An	   Indigenous	  Philosophical	  Ecology:	  Situating	   the	  Human’	  Rose	  describes	  the	   relationship	   between	   persons	   and	   place	   as	   one	   of	   mutual	   benefit.20	   Mutual	  benefits	   are	   exchanges	   between	   species	  which	   connect	   the	   interests	   of	   humans	   to	  the	   interests	   of	   non-­‐humans	   and	   the	   environment.	   An	   example	   of	   mutual	   benefit	  given	  by	  Rose	  involves	  sustainable	  forms	  of	  hunting	  and	  gathering	  which	  foster	  life	  for	  both	  humans	  and	  other	  species,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  land.	  She	  notes	  that	  the	  Aboriginal	  burning	   of	   country	   removes	   long	   grasses	   and	   grass	   seeds	   and	   encourages	   new	  growth	   that	   is	   rich	   in	   nutrients.	   While	   this	   provides	   an	   excellent	   food	   source	   for	  wallabies,	   kangaroos,	   turkeys	   and	   cockatoos,	   it	   also	   benefits	   humans	   because	   it	  enables	   them	   to	   better	   see	   animal	   tracks	   and	   because	   the	   fattened	   animals	   are	  better	   to	  hunt.21	  Exchanges	  of	  benefit	  between	  species	  provide	   the	  human	  with	  an	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‘expanded	  sense	  of	  self	  brought	  about	  by	  various	  consubstantialities’	  with	  the	  places	  to	  which	  they	  belong.22	  	  Rose	   develops	   this	   ‘expanded	   sense	   of	   self’	   when	   referring	   to	   the	   flows	   of	  information	  that	  bridge	  differences	  between	  individuals,	  groups	  and	  species,	  giving	  them	  access	  to	  regions	  they	  wouldn’t	  otherwise	  inhabit.23	  She	  gives	  an	  example	  of	  a	  swift,	   flying	   across	   the	   sky,	   which	   gives	   humans	   access	   to	   valuable	   information	  about	   the	   seasons:	  when	   the	   swift	   flies	   low	   it	   tells	   that	   the	  wet	   season	   is	   about	   to	  begin,	  and	  when	  it	  flies	  high	  it	  tells	  that	  winter	  is	  imminent	  and	  that	  humans	  should	  make	   camp.	   The	   swift,	   in	   other	   words,	   gives	   humans	   knowledge	   of	   what	   is	  happening	   in	   the	   upper	   atmosphere,	   emplacing	   humans	   within	   this	   enlarged	  domain.	  Rose	  describes	  the	  resulting	  relationship	  to	  place	  in	  custodial	  terms.	  She	  speaks	  of	   an	   ecological	   self	   that	   ‘sustains	   the	   country	   in	   the	   self	   and	   the	   self	   in	   the	  country’.24	  An	  ecological	  self	  is	  engaged	  in	  dialogue	  with	  place.	  She	  gives	  an	  example	  of	  Jessie	  Wirrpa:	  Jessie	  took	  care	  of	  her	  country	  and	  her	  country	  took	  care	  of	  her	  ...	  Country	  was	   the	  ground	  of	  her	  being;	   she	  was	  a	  walking	  and	  ephemeral	  nexus	  of	  country,	   Dreamings,	   and	   care.	   Nothing	   stood	   alone	   in	   Jessie's	   country;	  everything	  was	  happening	  because	  of	  the	  care	  of	  others	  …	  	  An	  Aboriginal	  ethic	   of	   ecological	   engagement	   requires	   that	   subjects,	   human	   and	   non-­‐human,	   attend	   to	   each	   other	   ...	   Jessie	   Wirrpa	   lived	   an	   ethic	   of	  intersubjective	   attention	   in	   a	   sentient	  world	  where	   life	   happens	   because	  living	  things	  take	  notice	  ...	  [T]his	  ethic	  is	  not	  human-­‐centred.	  Care	  of	  one's	  country,	   one's	   people,	   one's	   Dreaming	   sites,	   and	   one's	   non-­‐human	  countrymen	  are	  not	  governed	  by	  different	  ethics;	  they	  are	  actions	  through	  which	  people	  bring	  forth,	  and	  are	  themselves	  brought	  forth	  by,	  interacting	  subjectivities.25	  Through	   this	   ethic,	   Rose	   aims	   to	   provide	   an	   alternative	   to	   the	   paradigms	   of	  mainstream	  Western	   science	   and	   philosophy	  which	   separate	   the	   human	   from	   the	  world26	  and	  view	  the	  nonhuman	  world	  as	  a	  mere	  backdrop	   for	  human	  projections	  and	   intentions.27	   Rather	   than	   the	   non-­‐human	  world	   being	   comprised	   of	   objects,	   it	  has	  the	  quality	  of	  being	  a	  subject:	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[I]n	   this	   Indigenous	   system,	   subjectivity	   in	   the	   form	   of	   sentience	   and	  agency	   is	  not	  solely	  a	  human	  prerogative	  but	   is	   located	  throughout	  other	  species	  and	  perhaps	  throughout	  country	   itself.	  Subject–subject	  encounter	  is	   an	   ecological	   process	   that	   undermines	   the	   whole	   basis	   of	   hegemonic	  anthropocentrism.28	  As	  Rose	  makes	  clear,	  human	  and	  non-­‐human	  alike	  are	  subjects,	   each	  separate	  and	  distinct,	  whose	  interactions	  bring	  about	  intersubjectivity.	  	  Rose	  is	  insistent	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  specificity	  in	  these	  interactions.	  She	  says:	  ‘Mutual	   care	   is	   neither	   infinitely	   obligatory,	   nor	   is	   it	   diffuse	   and	   undifferentiated.	  The	  structure	  of	  mutual	  care	  is	  local	  and	  bounded’.29	  [G]eneralizability	   …	   contrasts	   forcibly	   with	   the	   culture	   of	   place	   that	   is	  characteristic	  of	  many	  kin-­‐based	  societies.	  From	  a	  perspective	  developed	  in	   dialogue	   with	   Aboriginal	   Australian	   peoples,	   we	   would	   ask	   questions	  about	  specificity:	  ‘which	  country?	  which	  people?	  ...	  the	  genius	  of	  Aboriginal	  Australians	  finds	  its	  greatest	  expression	  in	  a	  theory	  and	  practice	  of	  place	  …	  It	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  sacred	  geography	  of	  country,	  sites	  and	  tracks,	  and	  it	  is	  central	  to	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  Dreaming.	  	  Aboriginal	  people	  localize	  social	  groups	  within	  country	  …	  Consubstantiality	  with	  country	  is	  not	  generalized	  as	  earth	  and	  humanity,	  but	  is	  pre-­‐eminently	  local	  …	  this	  country,	  this	  group	  of	  people,	  these	  Dreamings	  …	  	  Specificity	  requires	  both	  localization	  and	  temporalization.	  It	  requires	  exchanges	  of	  substance	  between	  specific	  persons	  and	  places.	  Because	  exchanges	  are	  specific	  and	  personalized,	  they	  unfold	  in	  real	  time.	  They	  are	  not	  just	  waves	  in	  the	  cosmic	  sea	  of	  un-­‐change.30	  As	   these	   passages	   suggest,	   Rose	   understands	   specificity	   and	   thisness	   to	   mean	  location,	  which	   is	   to	  say	   identifiability	   in	   time	  and	  space.	  Her	  aim	   is	   to	  distinguish	  the	  specific,	  ‘the	  real	  here	  and	  now	  of	  our	  lives’,	  from	  what	  she	  understands	  to	  be	  the	  abstractedness	  and	  ‘generalizability’	  of	  ‘the	  archetypal’.31	  The	  archetypal,	  for	  her,	  is	  ‘cosmic	  flux’	  which	  abolishes	  time	  in	  ‘endless	  cycles	  of	  repetition’	  which	  are	  ‘inimical	  to	  growth’.32	  	  Summing	   up,	   Rose’s	   insistence	   that	   ‘ecological	   engagement	   requires	   that	  subjects,	  human	  and	  non-­‐human,	  attend	  to	  each	  other’33	  allows	  her	  to	  challenge	  the	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human-­‐centredness	  of	  the	  proprietorial	  model	  of	  belonging	  and	  to	  propose,	  instead,	  a	  custodial	  model.	  And	  her	  insistence	  on	  the	  notions	  of	  emplacement	  and	  specificity	  highlight	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  care	  and	  responsibility	  derive	  from	  real	  life	  rather	  than	  abstract	   principles.	   We	   think,	   however,	   that	   there	   are	   conceptual	   tensions	   in	   her	  work	  as	  a	  result	  of	  her	  presumption	  of	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  identity	  logic.	  While	  she	  seeks	  to	  emphasise	  connection,	  she	  usually	  assumes	  that	  it	  derives	  from	  the	  interaction	  of	  subjects,	   which	   is	   to	   say	   that	   connection	   is	   secondary	   to	   the	   separation	   that	  constitutes	  subjecthood.	  	  Furthermore,	  when	  turning	  non-­‐humans	  into	  subjects,	  she	  is	   inadvertently	   projecting	   human-­‐centred	   assumptions	   about	   identity	   and	  subjectivity.	  We	  think	  that	  a	  relational	   logic	  might	  allow	  Rose	  to	  more	  consistently	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  ecological	  responsibility.	  
—RELATIONAL POSSIBILITIES In	  this	  section	  we	  will	  draw	  attention	  to	  some	  of	  the	  relational	  possibilities	  in	  Rose’s	  work,	  using	   these	  possibilities	   to	   indicate	   the	   conceptual	   tensions	   involved.	  Let	  us	  take	  a	  rich	  example	  of	  ecological	   intertwinement	  that	  Rose	  experienced	  during	  her	  fieldwork.	  She	  describes	  her	  participation	  in	  the	  Bandimi	  ceremony,	  which	  involves	  a	  dance	  through	  which	  Dreaming	  power	  contained	  within	  the	  earth	  is	  called	  up:	  	  I	  learned	  to	  dance,	  and	  so	  I	  learned	  to	  work	  the	  ground	  with	  my	  feet,	  and	  learned	   to	   make	   the	   dance-­‐call	   that	   is	   integral	   to	   the	   pattern.	   Thus	   I	  learned	   that	   the	   body	   connects	   earth	   and	   air	   when	   you	   dance.	   The	   call	  comes	  from	  deep	  within	  and	  is	  propelled	  by	  the	  impact	  of	  your	  feet	  on	  the	  ground.	  It	  comes	  to	  feel	  as	  if	  the	  ground	  itself	  propels	  your	  voice	  out	  into	  the	   night	   sky.	   That	   call	   starts	   somewhere	   below	   your	   feet	   and	   ends	  somewhere	   out	   in	   the	   world.	   The	   call	   is	   a	   motion,	   a	   sound,	   a	   wave	   of	  connection.	  You	  are	  dancing	  the	  earth,	  and	  the	  earth	  is	  dancing	  you,	  and	  so	  perhaps	  you	  are	  motion,	  a	  sound,	  a	  wave	  of	  connection.	  You	  are	  bearer	  of	  the	  call,	  and	  perhaps	  you	  are	  also	  bearer	  of	  an	  answer.34	  	  Rose’s	   description	   of	   her	   relation	   with	   the	   ground	   reminds	   us	   of	   Buber’s	  description	   of	   becoming	   bound	   up	   in	   relation	   with	   the	   tree.	  We	   imagine	   that	   the	  border	   that	  distinguishes	   the	  ground	   from	  her	   foot	  would	  be	   intertwined	  with	  her	  body.	  Although	  she	   feels	   the	  pressure	  of	   the	  earth	  beneath	  her	   feet	  and	  enjoys	   the	  abrasive	  touch	  of	  dry	  dirt	  meeting	  soft	  skin,	   the	  ground	  is	  not	   ‘there’	  at	  a	  distance.	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Nor	   is	   it	   ‘here’	   in	   a	   Euclidean	   location.	   This	   experience	   occurs	   in	   the	   here	   of	  presence,	  here-­‐and-­‐there.	  This	  intertwined	  logic	  is	  implied	  when	  Rose	  says	  ‘You	  are	  dancing	   the	  earth,	  and	   the	  earth	   is	  dancing	  you,	  and	  so	  perhaps	  you	  are	  motion,	  a	  sound,	   a	  wave	   of	   connection.’	   And,	  when	   she	   says	   that	   the	   call	   ‘comes	   from	   deep	  within’,	   she	   suggests	   that	   the	   call	   does	   not	   come	   from	   deep	   within	   any	   locatable	  thing,	  but,	  rather,	  comes	  from	  the	  depth	  of	  a	  relation,	  from	  a	  state	  of	  no-­‐thingness	  or	  infinitude:	  ‘That	  call	  starts	  somewhere	  below	  your	  feet	  and	  ends	  somewhere	  out	  in	  the	  world.’	  	  This	  discussion	  of	  space	  leads	  to	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  the	  question	  of	  specificity.	  The	   specificity	   of	   this	   dance	   and	   this	   ground	   is	   not	   based	   on	   Euclidean-­‐linear	  location,	   but	   only	   arises	   through	   the	   no-­‐thingness	   of	   connection.	   Because	   it	   is	   not	  based	  on	  location,	  the	  specific	  is	  inclusive,	  holding	  the	  whole.	  To	  paraphrase	  Buber,	  the	  ground’s	  ‘intercourse	  with	  the	  elements	  and	  the	  stars	  are	  all	  present	  in	  a	  single	  whole’.	   Likewise,	   each	   specific	   footfall	   reveals	   anew	   the	  whole	   of	   the	   dance,	   each	  step	  feeling	  just	  right,	  without	  any	  rush	  to	  an	  end.	  Furthermore	  it	  is	  the	  unbounded	  quality	  of	  specificity	  that	  allows	  this	  dance,	  now,	  to	  be	  an	  experience	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  generations	  of	  dancing,	  the	  presence	  of	  Dreaming.	  This	  now	  holds	  within	  it	  all	  time.	  	  Rose’s	   description	  of	   the	   experience	  of	  Bandimi	  dancing	   suggests	   a	   relational	  ontology.	  There	  is	  no	  clear	  or	  definitive	  demarcation	  between	  earth,	  sky	  and	  body.	  Each	  is	  bound	  to	  all	  the	  others;	  different	  but	  inseparable	  elements	  of	  her	  experience.	  Nor	   is	   it	  possible	   to	   identify	   the	  source	   from	  which	  the	  dance	  derives,	  because	  the	  energy	  of	  the	  dance	  seems	  to	  come	  from	  everywhere.	  Rose	  describes	  this	  energy	  as	  a	  ‘call’	  or	  ‘wave	  of	  connection’,	  shared	  by	  all	  participants,	  and	  makes	  the	  important	  point	  that	  you	  are	  both	  the	  bearer	  of	  the	  call	  and	  the	  bearer	  of	  the	  response.	  What	  this	  points	   to	   is	  a	   form	  of	  being	  that	   is	  non-­‐finite,	   that	   involves	   the	   intertwining	  of	  insides	   and	   outsides.	   Accordingly	   there	   is	   no	   process	   of	   moving	   between	   finite	  points	   (earth,	   sky,	   body,	   caller	   and	   responder)	   for	   they	   are	   already	   implicated	   in	  each	   other.	   Indeed,	   we	   imagine	   that	   rather	   than	   having	   the	   restlessness	   of	  continuous	  movement,	  the	  dance	  would	  have	  a	  feeling	  of	  movement-­‐and-­‐stillness.	  While	   Rose’s	   description	   of	   the	   experience	   of	   dancing	   raises	   for	   us	   the	  possibility	  of	  a	   relational	  analysis,	  her	  own	  analysis	  of	   it	   relies	  on	   locations,	   linear	  time	  and	  the	  actions	  of	  subjects.	  She	  uses	  the	  idea	  of	  people	  flipping	  between	  subject	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positions,	   from	   ‘agent’	   to	   ‘vehicle’	   to	   ‘agent’.	  This	   is	   a	   logic	   that	  derives	   ‘mutuality’	  from	  the	  oppositional	  logic	  of	  separate	  positions:	  for	  her	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  be	  both	  agent	  and	  vehicle	  simultaneously;	  one	  can	  only	  take	  turns	  in	  being	  agent	  or	  vehicle.	  For	   the	  dancer	   there	   is	  also	  one's	  embodied	   iridescence.	  There	   is	   the	   flip	  between	   the	   feet	   on	   the	   ground	   and	   the	   ground	   on	   the	   feet:	   who	   is	   the	  dancer	  and	  who	  is	  the	  danced?	  If	  I	  hold	  the	  analytic	  privilege	  on	  motion,	  I	  find	   that	   both	   are	   dancer	   and	   danced,	   and	   that	   the	   significance	   of	   this	  mutuality	  is	  located	  in	  the	  flip	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  us	  …	  	  One	  is	  transformed	  from	  agent	  (calling)	  to	  vehicle	  (being	  called	  or	  moved	  through)	  and	  back	  and	  forth	  all	  night	  long.	  To	  dance,	  therefore,	  is	  to	  move	  within	  a	  generative,	  liminal	  matrix	  of	  betweens—between	  the	  caller	  and	  the	  respondent,	  between	  the	  ground	  and	  the	  foot,	  the	  earth	  and	  the	  air;	  between	  the	  many	  interlocking	  patterns	  and	  flips,	  and	  between	  the	  enduring	  and	  the	  ephemeral.35	  Rose’s	  analysis	  hinges	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  between	  that	  joins	  separate	  locations	  or	  identities,	  ‘caller’	  and	  ‘respondent’,	  ‘ground’	  and	  ‘foot’.	  In	  this	  model	  connections	  are	   secondary	   to	   the	   separations	   they	   attempt	   to	   bridge.	   The	   logic	   of	   oscillation	  implies	  a	  similar	  sense	  of	  separation	  in	  time.	  Rose’s	  reference	  to	  something	  flipping	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  the	  dancer	  and	  the	  danced	  evokes	  a	  sense	  of	  taking-­‐turns:	  now	  it	  is	  the	  dancer	  that	  embodies	  the	  energy,	  now	  it	  is	  the	  dance.	  Another	  way	  of	  saying	   this	   is	   that	   oscillation	   is	   sequential,	   events	   taking	   place	   in	   points	   in	   time	  which	  are	  logically	  and	  experientially	  distinct.	  This	  linearity	  cannot	  comprehend	  an	  experience	   of	   simultaneity,	   for	   example,	   an	   experience	   of	   being	   caller-­‐and-­‐respondent	   at	   the	   same	   moment.	   When	   Rose	   emphasises	   motion	   in	   order	   to	   get	  from	  one	  position	  to	  another,	  she	  cannot	  allow	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  experience	  of	  movement-­‐and-­‐stillness	  in	  which	  the	  destination	  is	  nowhere	  but	  here.	  	  This	  is	  not	  the	  only	  place	  where	  Rose	  discusses	  temporality.	  She	  often	  uses	  her	  anthropological	   work	   with	   the	   Yarralin	   people	   to	   highlight	   the	   inadequacy	   of	  western	  assumptions	  about	   linear	   time.36	  A	  clear	  sense	  of	  Rose's	  understanding	  of	  indigenous	   experiences	   of	   time,	   and	   the	   way	   they	   confound	   western	   concepts	   of	  linearity,	  can	  be	  found	  in	  her	  widely	  cited	  book	  Dingo	  Makes	  us	  Human.	  Rose	  tells	  us	  that	   the	   Yarralin	   people	   understand	   events	   and	   entities	   with	   reference	   to	   two	  distinct	  categories	  of	  time:	  ordinary	  time,	  which	  can	  largely	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	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of	   western	   concepts	   of	   sequence	   and	   linearity,	   and	   Dreaming,	   which	   cannot.	  Ordinary	  time,	  as	  she	  explains,	   is	  characterised	  by	  sequence	  and	  change.	  Life	  has	  a	  beginning,	  a	  middle	  and	  an	  end,	  and	  all	  things	  grow	  old	  and	  die.37	  'Events	  occur	  and	  never	   recur	   in	   the	  same	  way.'38	  Dreaming,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   is	  a	  bounded	  period	  (about	  a	  hundred	  years	  before	   the	  present)	   in	  which	  enduring	  events	   take	  place.39	  Dreaming	  is	  the	  before	  time,	  from	  which	  Law	  emerged.	  In	   rituals,	   Dreamings	   are	   remobilised	   and	   brought	   into	   the	   present.	   For	  example,	   Rose	   says,	   'Birth	   brings	   Dreaming	   into	   the	   present.	   Each	   birth	   is	   a	  microcosmic	   recapitulation	   of	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   cosmos;	   each	   birth	   regenerates	  women's	   Law	   and	   being.	   So,	   too,	   does	   ceremony’.40	   Only	   in	   this	   way	   are	   people	  drawn	  out	  of	  the	  fleeting	  and	  ephemeral	  of	  ordinary	  time	  and	  into	  enduring	  cycles.	  	  Rose	   tells	   us	   that	   events	   occurring	   in	   ordinary	   time	   only	   become	   enduring	  when	   they	   are	   part	   of	   'oscillating	   cycles'	   which	   'recur'.41	   Our	   problem	   is	   that	  recurrence	  is	  a	  linear	  concept,	  implying	  a	  repetition	  of	  the	  same.	  Thus	  for	  Rose,	  the	  connection	   of	   the	   birth	   of	   this	   child	   to	   the	   births	   and	   deaths	   of	   ancestors	   and	   to	  Dreaming	  lives	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  repetition.	  This	  elides	  uniqueness	  and	  reduces	  the	  specific	   events	   of	   people's	   lives	   to	   mere	   abstractions;	   they	   become	   examples	   of	  common	  structures	  or	  cycles.	  We	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  birth	  of	  this	  child	  is	  not	  just	  new	  and	  not	  just	  repetition,	  but	  is	  the	  rebirth	  of	  the	  whole	  world.	  Rose	   retains	   identities	   and	   locations	   to	   emphasise	   specificity	   and	   difference;	  that	  is,	  to	  avoid	  reductions	  to	  the	  sameness	  of	  abstractions.	  However,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	   it	   is	   identities	   and	   locations	   that	   are	   governed	   by	   the	   principle	   of	   sameness,	  characterised	   by	   abstractions	   and	   generalisations.	   This	   is	   the	   point	   of	   Buber’s	  account	  of	  an	  I-­‐It	  encounter	  with	  the	  tree.	  The	  specificity	  of	  an	  encounter	  only	  arises	  within	  the	  relational	  non-­‐finite	  logic	  of	  I-­‐Thou,	  which	  suspends	  identities	  and	  allows	  for	   incomparability.	   We	   think	   that	   Rose’s	   description	   of	   the	   dance	   experience	  accords	  with	  the	  I-­‐Thou	  logic,	  in	  which	  this	  is	  present	  and	  cannot,	  for	  that	  reason,	  be	  defined	  or	  bounded.	  	  This	   has	   implications	   for	   understandings	   of	   ecological	   relations	   and	   custodial	  forms	   of	   belonging.	   Let	   us	   return	   to	   the	   example	   of	   the	   swift.	   Rose	   says	   that	   the	  swift’s	   flight	   portends	   the	   future,	   giving	   humans	   access	   to	   regions	   they	   don’t	  ordinarily	   inhabit;	   she	   suggests	   that	   the	   swift’s	   flight	   gives	   them	  access	   to	   a	   place	  that	  is	  defined	  as	  not	  here,	  and	  a	  time	  that	  is	  not	  now.	  The	  sky	  is	  simply	  at	  a	  distance,	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a	  distance	  which	  information	  must	  traverse	  in	  order	  to	  get	  to	  the	  human	  standing	  on	  the	  earth	  below,	   ready	   to	   receive.	  A	   relational	  analysis	  would,	  by	  contrast,	  put	   the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  specificity	  of	  here,	  now.	  In	  relational	  ontology,	  humans	  extend	  their	  knowledge	  of	   country	  by	   seeing	   through	   and	  with	   the	   swift,	   by	   feeling	   the	   coming	  winter	   through	   the	   swift’s	   body.	   In	   this	   state,	   information	   doesn’t	   pass	   between	  humans	  and	  nonhumans;	   it	  doesn’t	  get	   to	   the	  human	  by	  crossing	   the	  vastness	  of	  a	  space	  which	   separates	   human	   and	  non-­‐human.	  Rather,	   the	   information	   carried	  by	  the	  swift	  would	  be	  accessible	  to	  the	  human	  because,	  in	  that	  moment	  of	  connection,	  human	   is	   also	   swift,	   also	   sky,	   also	   country.	   The	   human	   would	   not	   be	   one	   of	   a	  multiplicity	   of	   beings	  who	   occupy	   space	  within	   country.	   Rather,	   through	   relations	  with	  the	  swift	  and	  earth	  and	  sky,	  the	  human	  is	  a	  particular	  expression	  of	  country’s	  being.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  human	  is	  an	  ecological	  being,	  human-­‐and-­‐non-­‐human.	  This	   analysis	   changes	   the	  way	  we	  might	   think	   about	   Rose’s	   claim	   that	   Jessie	  Wirrpa	  ‘took	  care	  of	  her	  country	  and	  her	  country	  took	  care	  of	  her’.42	  She	  emphasises	  the	  mutual	  benefit	  for	  ‘interacting	  subjectivities’.43	  	  A	  relational	  approach	  would	  say	  that	   country	   and	   Jessie	   are	   intertwined,	   that	   Jessie	   doesn’t	   necessarily	   oscillate	  between	  being	  an	  agent	  and	  being	  a	  vehicle	  of	  country,	  for,	  in	  relational	  states,	  she	  is	  both	  at	  once.	  She	  is	  ecological	  being,	  Jessie-­‐and-­‐country.	  In	  this	  state,	  care	  does	  not	  arise	   from	   the	   benefits	   accruing	   to	   identity,	   but	   from	   the	   unboundedness	   of	  wholeness.	  This	   is	  how	  we	  understand	   the	   comments	   from	   the	   floodplains	  person	  cited	  by	  Rose.	  Returning	  home	  after	  being	  away,	  they	  comment,	  ‘you	  see	  the	  birds	  …	  you	  see	  the	  country,	  and	  your	  senses	  come	  back	  to	  you.	  You	  know	  what	   to	  do	  and	  where	  to	  go’.44	  This	  suggests	  that	  this	  person	  sees,	  smells,	  feels	  and	  knows	  through	  country;	   that	   country	   is	   inside	   them	  as	   they	   are	   inside	   it.	   This	   is	   an	   experience	   of	  wholeness	  rather	  than	  identity.	  	  
—CONCLUSION In	   conclusion,	   let	  us	   return	   to	   the	   issue	  of	   custodianship,	   that	   is,	   responsibility	   for	  and	  responsiveness	  to	  the	  other.	  	  	  Proprietorial	   forms	   of	   belonging	   describe	   care	   for	   place	   as	   a	   care	   of	   the	   self.	  Where	   there	   is	   a	   proprietorial	   subject	   who	   assumes	   responsibility	   for	   an	   other,	  responsiveness	   or	   receptivity	   to	   the	   other	   is	   not	   possible,	   for,	   in	   this	   ontological	  form,	   the	  other	  remains	  an	  object	   to	   the	  subject,	  a	   separate	   thing,	  abstracted	   from	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living	   space	   and	   time.	  Thus,	   place	   and	   the	   creatures	   and	  beings	   that	   inhabit	   it	   are	  reduced	  to	  being	  the	  objects	  of	  human	  subjects:	  because	  this	  place	  is	  my	  place,	  I	  am	  responsible	  for	  its	  care.	  Rose	   attempts	   to	   avoid	   this	   proprietorial	   logic	   by	   assigning	   subjecthood	   to	  places	  and	  creatures	  as	  well	  as	  humans.	  This	  allows	  her	  to	  conceive	  of	  belonging	  as	  mutual	   attention:	   I	   care	   for	   this	  place	  and	   this	  place	   cares	   for	  me.	  However,	  when	  Rose	   gives	   logical	   priority	   to	   distinct	   subjects,	   she	   is	   unable	   to	   conceptualise	   a	  genuine	  relational	  state.	  She	  describes	  a	  world	  in	  Euclidean	  and	  linear	  terms,	  where	  here	  and	  now	  are	  distinct	  positions,	  but	  cannot	  imagine	  genuinely	  ecological	  space	  and	   time	   where	   here	   is	   here-­‐and-­‐there	   and	   now	   is	   now-­‐and-­‐then.	   While	   she	   can	  develop	  a	  model	  of	  the	  ecologically	  emplaced	  self,	  where	  connections	  arise	  through	  interactions	  between	  locatable	  subjects,	  she	  cannot	  conceive	  of	  an	  ecological	  form	  of	  being	  that	  involves	  the	  intertwinement	  of	  person-­‐and-­‐place.	  	  A	   custodial	   form	   of	   belonging,	   we	   have	   argued,	   is	   based	   on	   a	   relational	  ontology,	   an	   ecological	   form	   of	   being	   which	   is	   open	   to	   and	   part	   of	   the	   world	   of	  undefinable	  differences.	  Since	  ecological	  being	  participates	  in	  the	  world	  to	  which	  it	  responds,	   the	  difference	  that	  calls	  (-­‐and-­‐responds)	   is	   inside	  and	  outside,	  here-­‐and-­‐there.	  Responsibility	  does	  not	  come	  from	  anyone,	  and	  is	  not	  to	  anyone,	  but	  emerges	  from	  relation.	  This	  has	  implications	  for	  how	  we	  think	  about	  specificity,	  that	  is,	  responsibility	  for	   this	   place.	   By	   deriving	   specificity	   through	   locations	   and	   boundedness,	   Rose	  inadvertently	   invokes	  a	  proprietorial	   form	  of	  belonging	  which	  excludes	  others.	  We	  are	   proposing	   instead	   a	   relational	   form	   of	   belonging	   that	   is	   both	   specific	   and	  inclusive.	   This	  was	  Buber’s	   point	   in	   his	   discussion	   of	   the	   encounter	  with	   the	   tree.	  When	  he	  is	  ‘bound	  up	  in	  relation’	  to	  this	  tree,	  this	  I-­‐Thou	  encounter	  does	  not	  exclude	  locations	   or	   boundaries	   or	   identifications.	   More	   importantly,	   however,	   an	   I-­‐Thou	  form	   of	   belonging	   includes	   others,	   here.	   Custodial	   belonging	   based	   on	   I-­‐Thou	  recognises	   the	   implication	   and	   inclusion	   of	   other	   people	   and	   places	   in	   this	   place,	  and,	  conversely,	   ‘my’	   implication	   in	  and	  responsibility	   for	  other	  people	  and	  places.	  All	  are	  here,	  now	  in	  this.	   —	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